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RECENT DECISIONS 
C1vn. PROCEDURE - JunGMENTs - ExCEPTIONs To nm RuLE oF RBs 
JunICATA-A land contract provided for a conveyance to Pearson from Adams 
and his wife. The wife was not a party to the contract and refused to execute 
the deed. Pearson sought specific performance requesting relief of a type not 
then available in Illinois1 and when asked if he would accept a deed from 
Adams alone, he refused. The action was dismissed. Adams then brought this 
action in ejectment and Pearson counterclaimed requesting a deed executed by 
Adams alone. The trial court found that the judgment in the previous action 
was res judicata as to the counterclaim. On appeal, held, reversed. The equities 
in favor of Pearson so far outweighed the basic policies of res judicata that the 
counterclaim was not barred. Adams 11. Pearson, 411 Ill. 431, 104 N.E. (2d) 
267 (1952). 
Res judicata is grounded in the dual policies of protecting the defendant 
from harassment and the public from multiplicity of litigation.2 The effect of 
the doctrine is a conclusive determination of all matters in issue or which should 
have been in issue.3 Theoretically this should be the result whenever a subse­
quent suit involves the same cause of action and the same parties, but such is 
not always the case. A finding that more than one cause of action arose from 
a particular set of facts is a simple but effective method of avoiding the bar.4
This technique has been employed where separate rights were found to exist 
under different statutes,5 or under a statute and the common law.6 However, 
more recent authority would appear to cast some doubt on the validity of this 
approach at least insofar as separate statutory rights are concerned.7 An equally 
simple method is a finding that the prior action involved the election of a non­
existent remedy.8 The most widely employed method is based on the failure to 
1 Valuation of inchoate dower right and abatement of the purchase price; or payment 
of value of dower to the wife with a deed executed free from the interest; or indemnity 
against the contingency that the dower might vest. Pearson v. Adams, 394 ill. 391, 68 
N.E. (2d) 777 (1946). The remedies have been allowed in other jurisdictions. 46 A.L.R. 
748 (1927); 148 A.L.R. 292 (1944). 
2Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. (2d) 891, 151 P. (2d) 846 (1944). 
3 Baltimore Trust Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co., (D.C. Ky. 1939) 25 F. Supp. 968. 
4Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 227 U.S. 434, 33 S.Ct. 274 (1913). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Smith v. Lykes Brothers-Ripley S.S. Co., (5th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 604. 
7 The meaning of cause of action has expanded to include the theories of action. 
Williamson v. Columbia Gas and Electric Corp., (3d Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 464. Also 
see Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586 (1933). It appears that separate actions 
will be allowed in cases where they are for wrongful death and personal injuries due to the 
same accident. Chamberlain v. Mo.-Ark. Coach Lines, Inc., 354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W. (2d) 
538 (1945). Annotation, 161 A.L.R. 208 (1946). Where it concerns separate actions for 
injury to person and to property, the majority rule is that there is one cause of action. 64 
A.L.R. 663 (1929); 127 A.L.R. 1081 (1940).
SNorwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E. (2d) 67 (1943); Missildine v.
Miller, 231 Iowa 371, 1 N.W. (2d) 110 (1941). 
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assert claims and defenses because of fraud, ignorance or mistake.9 Fraud is 
usually the clear case;10 ignorance and mistake may or may not result in a 
suspension of the rule depending on the particular facts. A distinction may be 
made as to errors of law and of fact, with the former not resulting in a suspen-
sion.11 Negligence may also preclude a suspension.12 In the principal case, 
the claim was one which would normally have been barred, but the court held 
that because of the equities involved, the principle of res judicata would not 
be applied. This is an extremely liberal approach but it is not without respect-
able authority.13 Where a party has elected a non-existent remedy or where 
there is a failure to assert part of the cause of action because of fraud, ignorance 
or mistake, one cannot quarrel with a finding that res judicata will not apply 
since these cases involve elements of involuntariness and of lack of knowledge 
in good faith. But where a party has actual knowledge and fails to assert the 
claim, the same considerations are not involved and the claim should be barred 
except where it was specifically withdrawn or reserved for future litigation.14 
A wide application of the rule of the principal case would result in considerable 
relitigation to determine the equities of the previous case, thus tending to super-
sede the doctrine of res judicata, which serves a highly desirable function in 
the legal system. It would seem the better rule to require a showing of reason-
able cause for the failure to assert the claim in the previous case. 
William A. Bain, Jr., S.Ed. 
9 In re 431 Oakdale Avenue Bldg. Corp., (D.C. ill. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 63. For an 
extensive annotation see 142 A.L.R. 905 (1943). 
10 Hyyti v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.W. 747 (1937); Vineseck v. Great Northern 
Ry. Co., 136 Minn. 96, 161 N.W. 494 (1917). The theory in these cases would seem to 
be that the guilty party is estopped to raise the question of res judicata because of his fraud. 
11 International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1932) 56 F. 
(2d) 708. Guettel v. United States, (8th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 229, cert. den. 305 U.S. 
603, 59 S.Ct. 64 (1938), concerned omission due to mistake of law but the language of 
the court at page 232 might be interpreted to bar claims whether the mistake was of 
fact or law. But see Hicks v. Stillwater County, 84 Mont. 38, 274 P. 296 (1929), where 
a mistake of law was involved. 
12 A party must acquaint himself with ascertainable facts. Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 
293, 254 P. 784 (1927). Also see Knabb v. Duner, 143 Fla. 92, 196 S. 456 (1940); 
Lightolier Co. v. Minter Homes Corp., 123 Misc. 420, 205 N.Y.S. 414 (1924). 
1a White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E. (2d) 798 (1942) (inequitable that stock-
holders should escape liability); State ex rel. White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court for 
Ferry County, 145 Wash. 576, 261 P. llO (1927) (no showing of damage to the property 
owner, with great loss certain for the applicant). 
14 McCaffrey v. Wiley, 103 Cal. App. (2d) 621, 230 P. (2d) 152 (1951). 
117 Stat. L. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §43. 
